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analyzed empirically. The authors use data from 36 European Union and OECD countries
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GMM System. An unbalanced panel is handled. The results allow the authors to support
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and to the econometric method applied.
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1 Introduction 
The topic of how VAT on financial services (hereafter, financial VAT) influences 
the size of the financial sector has not previously been studied empirically. 
Nonetheless, the development of the financial sector is an important issue. On the 
one hand, an expanding financial sector generates many positive externalities. As 
Levine (2005) states, financial systems produce information ex ante about likely 
investments and allocate capital; monitor investments and exercise corporate 
governance after providing finance; facilitate the diversification, trading, and 
management of risk; mobilize and pool savings; and ease the exchange of goods 
and services. As asserted by Schumpeter (1911, 1942), innovation (understood as 
the transfer of capital from businesses using old methods of production to 
businesses using new, innovative methods) takes place thanks to credit expansion. 
All this encourages the real economy positively.  
On the other hand, the excessive size of a financial sector could also generate 
negative externalities, such as the presence of systemic risk, which could provoke 
serious financial and economic crises, as noted by the IMF (2010). The fall of a big 
bank can hamper firms’ exposure to financial markets or direct funding, disrupting 
the traditional channels of interbank lending due to a lack of confidence. The recent 
experience of the financial crisis of 2007 shows how a small initial shock, such as 
the relatively minor sub-prime mortgage crisis in the USA, can lead to major 
economic repercussions due to the domino effect (Dreger and Kholodilin, 2013). 
Furthermore, the systemic financial crises had significant fiscal costs. The IMF 
(2010) points out that the negative external effects generated by financial market 
failures increase with the presence of a large and complex financial sector. This is 
due to the significant costs of the failure of a financial entity, because financial 
markets generally expect that governments will support the banking sector with 
funding in order to avoid adverse consequences (Hagen, 2013). This involves an 
additional moral hazard problem for the government. 
During a financial crisis, practice shows that the bigger the institution, the more 
likely it is that the public authorities will trigger a bail-out. The methodology 
followed by international credit rating agencies supports this point. Under these 
circumstances, it is difficult to avoid the presence of moral hazard. The prohibition 
of bailing out, which is one of the principles of the European Banking Union, is 
intended to avoid these situations. The controversy regarding the performance of 
some Italian banks, where it would be appropriate to apply the “bail in” principle 
(lost compensation against stocks and hybrid financial instruments as a first step), 
reveals the difficulties of putting into practice some measures designed to eliminate 
the moral hazard phenomenon. Furthermore, the financial crisis which began in 
2007 has shown the consequences of an excess of credit funding, the non-
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monotonic relationship between financial size and economic development, and the 
importance of a stable financial sector (Dominguez Martinez and Lopez Del Paso, 
2014).  
Nevertheless, some analysts consider that a larger financial sector is not 
necessarily harmful, and could even bring economic stability. The use of 
securitization and the loss of the traditional financial intermediation chain are the 
real concern and the source of difficulties. We could also add the creation of 
complex derivatives, such as credit default swaps, with a design that conceals 
where the core of the credit risk lies. Complexity and the obfuscation of credit risk 
are thus the primary source of the problem, as distinct from the size of financial 
institutions (Kay, 2015). Rather surprisingly, some recent studies such as Dupire 
and Van den Spiegel (2016) show that the biggest banks are less profitable and also 
less risky than smaller banks. These authors also suggest that stock prices since the 
pre-crisis period have evolved more favorably for the biggest banks than for the 
smallest ones.  
As Lockwood (2014) states, a recent literature has emerged that studies the 
undesirable activities of banks that generate external effects in the deposit and 
credit margins. The main result is that these external effects could be corrected by 
Pigouvian taxes that would be applied to the bank margins, as taxes on credits or 
deposits. Furthermore, these Pigouvian taxes could be complemented with taxes on 
financial services such as financial VAT, which could make it possible to recover 
VAT on inputs, contrary to the current system of exemption of financial services 
applied in the vast majority of countries.  
It is worth noting that VAT on financial services, applied in different countries, 
is not a Pigouvian tax. This is because the objective of financial VAT is not to 
eliminate the negative externalities that the financial sector generates, but to tax the 
consumption of financial services, in contrast to financial transaction taxes. The 
Financial Activities Tax (FAT), developed by the IMF (2010) and discussed in 
Burman et al. (2016), consists of three alternative versions of the same tax, 
designed to address different kinds of financial distortions. FAT1 eliminates the 
exemption of financial services on VAT. All rents generated in the financial sector 
are taxed by FAT2, while FAT3 discourages risk taking by taxing the excess on 
rents from a fixed high rate of return. FAT2 and FAT3 could serve to understand 
better the rules for applying Pigouvian taxes to financial margins.  
To sum up, the overall size of a country’s financial sector and the size of 
individual institutions have gained increased attention, especially in the wake of the 
global financial crisis of 2007–08. In this context, there have been many proposals 
to establish different types of taxation on financial institutions, through both direct 
and indirect taxes. As these are intended to reduce the size of the financial sector 
and its institutions or other aims, it is very valuable to determine the actual effects 
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of the new taxes on financial sector size. This paper focuses on financial VAT and 
analyzes the influence of financial service taxes on the size of the financial sector, 
contributing an empirical test to a topic only dealt with theoretically to date. 
Financial service taxes mean taxing financial services via VAT (meaning the 
elimination of the exemption of financial services from VAT), or via other, non-
VAT taxes on the value added of financial institutions.  
After this introduction, Section 2 explains what financial depth means and how 
it can be measured, in order to give a theoretical explanation of the possible 
influence of financial VAT on financial sector size in Section 3. In Section 4 we 
review the literature on the topic, while Section 5 specifies the models to estimate. 
Section 6 estimates the econometric models arranged in Section 5 and discusses the 
empirical results. Section 7 provides the concluding remarks.  
2 Definition of financial development and its 
measurement 
Rajan and Zingales (2003, p. 9) considers that financial development “would 
capture the ease with which any entrepreneur or company with a sound project can 
obtain finance, and the confidence with which investors anticipate an adequate 
return. Presumably, also, a developed financial sector can gauge, subdivide, and 
spread difficult risks, letting them rest where they can best be borne. Finally, it 
should do all this at low cost.”  
This definition would include the process of financial intermediation but also 
direct financing through markets. It is also important to differentiate between 
traditional financing activities and financialization. Whilst the former involves the 
financial services provided to the real economy by financial institutions, the latter 
concept refers, as is well known, to transactions between financial institutions, i.e. 
inside the sector; which neither influence the real economy nor fulfill the financial 
needs of other economic agents. 
Measurements of financial development can be formed by indicators of 
financial risk, financial sophistication or financial size. Financial risk can be 
captured by the risk of a credit default. Financial sophistication includes ratios such 
as equity market capitalization to GDP, or number of listed firms to population. 
Although they are proxies, these ratios broadly capture a country’s level of 
financial sophistication.  
Financial development can also be measured by the level of or changes in 
financial size, which is, basically, the weight of the financial sector in total GDP. 
Nevertheless, a problem emerges when trying to quantify the size of the financial 
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sector, because it is difficult to find available variables for posterior analysis that 
reflect faithfully the idea of the depth of the financial sector. 
Khan et al. (2006) analyzes financial size by the study of different variables 
called “fd” (acronym of financial depth). The variable fd1 measures the domestic 
credit (loans) provided to the private sector over total GDP. This variable plus the 
total capitalization of the stock exchange as a percentage of the GDP is measured 
by fd2. This variable also includes an indicator of financial sophistication: 
capitalization of the stock exchange. This indicator is affected by the market prices, 
resulting in a deviation from the resources actually channeled to the corporations. 
Finally, fd3 represents the previous variable plus the capitalization of the public 
bonds market as a percentage of GDP. The last indicator is the most exhaustive of 
the three, but it is also the variable with the least data. In contrast, the first variable 
is the most available, but it represents a more limited approach. The first two 
variables focus on the domestic private sector, while the third variable relates to the 
public bonds market and thus it involves the public sector. 
3 Influence of financial VAT on financial sector size 
As far as we know, Aigner and Bierbrauer (2015) have contributed one of the first 
theoretical models of the impact of financial VAT on financial sector size. The 
authors base their findings on the analytical models of Ramsey (1927) and Mirrlees 
(1972), in which they include the financial sector. Aigner and Bierbrauer (2015) 
develop a model with the following features: there is a household sector that 
receives labor income, which is used to buy a final product. In addition, there is a 
productive sector that employs the labor force as an input and produces goods. The 
financial sector is introduced in the following way: workers have to be 
compensated for their work before their employers obtain income from the sale of 
the products. Thus, a business that wants to hire workers needs a financial 
intermediary that provides funding for payment of salaries. The intermediary is 
compensated by the promise of the repayment of the amount by the business after 
the sale of the goods. In this way, consumers receive the wage before the market of 
final goods opens. In t=0 households receive a wage, and until t=1, the wage is 
kept in a deposit account provided by the financial intermediaries, receiving the 
deposit plus the interest in t=1. The producers apply for a loan to the banks in t=0 
for paying the wages, which is returned with interest in t=1. The consumption of 
the government is determined exogenously and the government also collects taxes. 
There is a tax administration that introduces a tax on wages, w ,  a value added 
tax rate on goods (hereafter, VAT rate), that we denote by  , and also a value 
added tax rate on  financial services (hereafter, financial rate), denoted by b . 
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 11 (2017–7) 
www.economics-ejournal.org 6 
Aigner and Bierbrauer (2015) compare the working of the current VAT system 
with a hypothetical VAT system. The current VAT system in most countries 
exempts the financial sector from value added taxation, setting 0   and 0b  . 
Input VAT can only be fully creditable if the zero-rate method is applied. The 
hypothetical VAT system considered by the authors treats the financial sector and 
the rest of the economy equally, and is characterized by 0b   . Aigner and 
Bierbrauer (2015) study the impact of VAT exemption1 by comparing the 
competitive equilibria that arise under these two systems. 
Aigner and Bierbrauer (2015) describe the optimization problems of a 
household, a firm and a financial intermediary. All economic agents maximize in 
t=1. The households choose the labor supply and the deposits that maximize their 
utility facing the constraint that the consumed money has to be less or equal to the 
deposited money. The maximization problem of businesses is choosing the labor 
demand and the loan volume that maximizes profits (sells minus the loan volume 
including interest). Businesses face the constraint that the loan volume is higher 
than or equal to the wages paid. Banks maximize profits (non-defaulting loan 
volume minus deposit volume). The constraint satisfies that the bank labor force 
by  is higher than or equal to the sum of the product of each financial service 
(deposit or loan) and the additional unit of labor input that an additional financial 
service requires. The tax administration seeks a Pareto-efficient tax system in 
which there is no other tax system that satisfies the revenue requirement of the tax 
administration and makes either the households, or the businesses or the bankers 
better off while making no one worse off. 
Based on Equation (18) of Aigner and Bierbrauer (2015), the equilibrium of 
loan volume is equal to: 
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d deq
w
l l
i
l
i




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
,      (1) 
where d are the additional units of labor input that an additional deposit requires,  
l are the additional units of labor input that an additional loan requires, di is the 
net interest of the deposit, and li is the net interest of the loan. 
As stated above, the financial sector is involved in financial transactions with 
households when acquiring deposits and with the goods producers (businesses) 
when granting loans. First we focus on the interaction between banks and 
_________________________ 
1 The incidence of VAT is an unsettled question. Some authors, including the European Commission 
(2003) and Benedek et al. (2015), find that the pass-through of a lower VAT rate to lower prices for 
the consumers has never been fully realized. 
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households. In the hypothetical VAT system, the financial VAT rate is applied to 
the net interest of the deposit di  that is realized by households when selling 
deposits to banks and the gross interest (1 )d bi   is paid by the banks. 
Nonetheless, under a VAT system that includes financial transactions and collects 
VAT using an invoice-credit method, banks would be able to credit the VAT 
payment of d bi  . Hence the relevant interest for households and banks related to 
deposits is di , independently from b .  
With regard to businesses, Aigner and Bierbrauer (2015) consider two cases: 
one in which businesses can credit VAT payments (financial VAT), and one in 
which they cannot. For each case, there will be a different competitive equilibrium. 
In the first scenario, in which financial VAT can be credited, taxes on financial 
services affect the size of the financial system according to this equation: 
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.    (2) 
In this scenario, the relevant interest is the net interest on the loan li for 
businesses and banks. 
In the second case, when financial VAT cannot be credited, the equilibrium of 
the volume of loans differs from the result of the previous case according to: 
 
1
1
eq eq
v
b
l l





.        (3) 
In the current VAT system, in which financial services are exempt and VAT 
payments cannot be credited, the ratio (3) would be equal to the ratio (2), due to the 
fact that the financial rate is equal to zero. If zero-rating with VAT input credits is 
in force, the ratio (2) also applies. 
Thus, the only case in which financial VAT affects the size of the loan and 
therefore the size of the financial sector is in the hypothetical VAT system without 
VAT input crediting. 
The main results of Aigner and Bierbrauer (2015) are summarized in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Cases of financial service taxation and their impact on loan volume 
                           Cases: 
     VAT system:                      
1 2 
Cannot credit financial VAT Can credit financial VAT 
Current 0, 0b    
I 
1
1
1 b




 

 
Loan volume not altered by 
financial rate 
II 
 
1   
Loan volume not altered by 
financial rate 
Hypothetical 0b    
III 
1
1 b




 
An increase of the financial rate 
reduces the financial sector size 
IV 
 
1   
Loan volume not altered by 
financial rate 
4 Determinants of financial sector size: literature review 
As stated above, there is no empirical literature on the effects of VAT on financial 
size. In this section we focus on the variables that determine financial sector 
development. Firstly, as Klein and Olivei (2008) point out, it is important to note 
the lack of theoretical models that explain the determinants of financial sector 
depth. Nevertheless, there are some models that aim to explain the influence of 
some variables on financial size. It is worth mentioning the model of McKinnon 
(1973), which establishes a positive relationship between financial development 
and the level of output, which results from the complementarity between money 
and capital. We can also highlight the model of Huybens and Smith (1999), which 
models the strong negative long run correlation observed between inflation and 
financial development in countries with a low or moderate long-term inflation rate. 
English (1999), in contrast, models the increase of financial sector depth due to 
increased inflation. Finally, Do and Levchenko (2007) estimate a model in which 
goods differ in their need for external funding, which provokes changes in the 
equilibrium of financial development in trading countries. 
Huang (2010b) and Ayadi et al. (2013) provide an exhaustive review of the 
empirical literature. They mention the following variables as the most explanatory: 
institutional and regulatory variables, variables of political stability, kind of 
property of the bank, macroeconomic factors such as economic stability or 
prosperity, variables of fiscal policy, openness to financial flows (financial 
openness), trade openness, geography, investment and remittances, and other 
variables such as culture or endowment factors. 
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La Porta et al. (1997) is one of the first papers to deal with the influence of 
institutional variables on financial sector size. This paper shows that the countries 
with the worst investment protection, measured by the nature of the law and the 
quality of the state of law, have smaller capital markets. Many authors also study 
the function of institutions in financial development: Levine et al. (2000), Beck et 
al. (2003), Rajan and Zingales (2003), Law and Demetriades (2005), Chinn and Ito 
(2006), Djankov et al. (2007), Law and Azman-Saini (2008), Huang (2010a), Luca 
and Spatafora (2012) and Allen et al. (2014). Other authors focus on the influence 
of political instability, corruption and other political determinants of financial 
development, such as Barth et al. (2004), Dinc (2005), Detragiache et al. (2005), 
Micco et al. (2007) and Roe and Siegel (2011).  
Macroeconomic variables are also taken into account in the literature, for 
instance economic stability, measured by the inflation rate (Huybens and Smith, 
1999; English, 1999; Boyd et al., 2001; Khan et al., 2006; and Bahadir and Valev, 
2015), the degree of economic prosperity of a country, measured by the level of 
GDP per capita, or the population, (King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997; Jaffee 
and Levonian, 2001). Nonetheless, Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) show that 
financial development affects growth: it is good only up to a point, after which it 
becomes a drag on growth (see also Dominguez Martinez and Lopez Del Paso, 
2014).  
Other determinants of financial sector development are studied by the 
literature, such as the variables relating to the fiscal policy of the country, for 
instance public deficit, particularly in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) and 
Christensen (2004). The literature of financial development has also considered 
financial openness as a determinant of financial sector size. That is, the openness of 
accounts to the exterior and financial flows to abroad can influence the financial 
development, as Klein and Olivei (2008) show. In addition to financial openness, it 
is also important to consider the influence of trade openness on financial 
development, measured as the sum of exports plus imports; see Levine (1997), 
Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002), Rajan and Zingales (2003), Law and Demetriades 
(2005), Gries et al. (2009), Kim et al. (2010), Kim et al. (2011) and Raza et al. 
(2014). 
Some authors have remarked on the importance of geographical variables as 
determinants of financial development, but generally focusing on other kinds of 
variables than the geographical ones. Do and Levchenko (2007) developed a new 
instrumentation strategy based on geographical determinants exogenous to trade 
patterns. Many authors also focus on the variables of investment, both domestic 
and foreign, and the variable of remittances (Gupta et al., 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al., 2011; Huang, 2010a and Ayadi et al., 2013). Other authors find natural 
resources are also determinants of financial development, such as Shahbaz et al. 
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(2013) and Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2014). In addition to the variables 
mentioned above, there are many other variables considered in the literature as 
determinants of financial development. These include the degree of industrial 
competitiveness, the presence of a banking crisis, or the culture, as in Kroszner et 
al. (2007), Braun and Raddatz (2008) and Kim and Lin (2011). Some authors, such 
as Huang (2010b), aim to estimate a wide-ranging model that attempts to 
incorporate all the studied variables, at least the most significant. Sharpe (1995) 
and Altunbas et al. (2010) also show the need to use asset structure indicators (i.e., 
liquidity and capitalization) to assess banks’ ability and willingness to supply new 
loans. Haldane and May (2011) sustain that the traditional rationale for such 
requirements is that higher requirements for banks’ capital and liquid assets reduce 
idiosyncratic risks to the balance sheets of individual banks. 
5 Specification 
The purpose of this section is not the study of the determinants of financial sector 
development or size, but the formulation of an explanatory model in which we can 
see the impact of VAT taxation of financial services on the size of the financial 
sector. To do this, we estimated panel data with information from 1961 to 2012 for 
36 countries, including all the countries of the European Union (27) and the 
OECD, with the exceptions of Switzerland, Cyprus, Romania and Malta.  
We estimate a dynamic panel data model by the two-step GMM System 
method, following Boyd et al. (2001), Law and Azman-Saini (2008) and Huang 
(2010a). We estimate a dynamic model due to assuming that the financial 
development of the previous period affects that of the current period, a hypothesis 
that can be easily checked by the presence of good econometric properties in the 
model. Table 2 summarizes the econometric method and results of some papers in 
the literature. 
In particular, we will estimate dynamic models using the GMM System 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The 
analytical formulation is as follows: 
 
, , 1i t i t T it it ity y T X       ,     (4) 
where ,i ty  is the variable that reflects the indicator of financial development of a 
country i at time t, , 1i ty   is the first lag of the endogenous variable  and   is its 
coefficient. itT  is our vector of target variables (financial VAT and taxes separate 
from VAT), itX  is the vector of the remaining exogenous variables, T  and  , 
are the coefficients, and it , is the residual.   
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Table 2: Econometric models and data in the literature 
Study Methodology 
Main impacts on 
financial development 
Boyd et al. 
(2001) 
OLS, Generalized-Method-of-Moments (GMM) in first 
differences 
inflation (-) 
Barth et al. 
(2004) 
OLS, GMM instrumental variables regression stability (+) 
Detragiache et 
al. (2005) 
OLS 
inflation (-), information 
(+) 
Khan et al. 
(2006) 
Nonlinear least squares (NLLS) psize (-) 
Klein and Olivei 
(2008) 
OLS openness (+) 
Law and Azman-
Saini (2008) 
System-GMM stability (+) 
Huang (2010a) 
OLS, Least Square Dummy Variables (LSDV), bias-
corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC), and system GMM 
investment (+) 
Kim et al. (2010) Pooled Mean Group (PMG) openness (-) 
Kim et al. (2011) Simultaneous-equation model (SEM) openness (-) 
Ayadi et al. 
(2013) 
Random-effects panel regression debt (-), fdi (0,-) 
Shahbaz et al. 
(2013) 
Dynamic unrestricted error correction model (UECM) energy (+) 
Allen et al. 
(2014) 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
mobiles, industry and 
gdppc (+), density (-,0) 
Asongu (2014) OLS population (-), fdi (0,-) 
 
We use different dependent variables as indicators of financial development. 
The size of the financial sector (fsize) is the logarithm of the percentage of 
domestic credit provided by the financial sector over the total GDP in first 
differences, in order to avoid unit root problems. The banking sector size (bsize) is 
the logarithm of the percentage of domestic credit provided by the banking system 
over the total GDP, and is also in first differences. Total financial depth (fdepth) 
reflects financial sector size, but also financial sophistication, because this variable 
is the sum of fsize and the logarithm of the stock capitalization to GDP. This last 
variable is not in first differences because our tests found it does not have unit root 
problems.  
The following explanatory variables are related to the public sector. The first of 
our interest variables is the interaction of the financial tax rate (the marginal tax 
rate applied to financial services) and financial VAT (tb*fVAT), financial VAT 
being measured as a binary variable that takes the value 1 when financial VAT is in 
force in the country and 0 otherwise, applying the value 1 to data in Table 3, with 
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Table 3: Methods of taxing financial services employed in international practice 
Method Countries where applied Method Countries where applied 
Zero-
rating 
Quebec (up to 2013), New Zealand (since 2005; 
Merrill, 2011),  
Net operating 
income (full 
taxation) 
Mexico (since 1992; Schatan, 2003) 
Exempti
on with 
input 
credits 
(partial 
taxation) 
Australia (since 2000; De la Feria and Walpole, 
2009), Singapore (since 1994; Jenkins and 
Khadka, 1998), Malaysia (since 2015; IMF, 
2015) 
Subtraction 
method 
(differentiated 
taxation) 
Italy (since 1998; Keen et al., 2010), proposed 
in Japan to be established in 1950, but rejected 
(De la Feria and Krever, 2012), in Canada in 
1987(Schenk, 2009), and in the Philippines (Xu 
and Krever, 2016) proposed on 2000, but 
abandoned before implementing 
Taxing 
fee-based 
services 
(partial 
taxation) 
Australia, Singapore, South Africa (since 1996; 
Merrill, 2011), Malaysia, the Philippines (since 
1988), India (since 1994; Deloitte, 2013), China 
(since 1994; Owens, 2014), Korea (since 1982; 
MSF, 2012), Belgium (1971–1977; Ernst and 
Young, 2009), Slovenia (since March 2013, PKF, 
2014), Andorra (since 2013), Ghana (since 2013; 
PWC, 2013), Mexico (since 1980; Schatan, 
2003), Thailand (since 1992; BOI, 2016) 
 
Separate taxes 
(differentiated 
taxation) 
Quebec, Israel (since 1981; Gillis, 1987), 
France, Denmark, Italy, Andorra (from June 
2002 to 2013, as a sales equalization tax),  
China (from 1994 (Owens, 2014) up to 1 May 
2016 (KPMG, 2016)), India (since 1994 
(Deloitte, 2013), proposed under GST in 2016, 
but postponed until 2017), the Philippines 
(since 1946; except for the year 2003 when it 
was taxed under VAT, ZGLO, 2006), Taiwan 
(since 1 April 1986; ROC, 2016), Thailand, 
Iceland and Korea 
Option to 
tax (full 
or partial 
taxation) 
Option to tax only fees (partial taxation): Belgium 
(since 1978), Lithuania (since 1 May 2004), 
France (since 1979) 
Option to tax fees and margin (full taxation): 
Austria (since 1997 with retroactive effect), 
Estoniai (since 2002), Germany (since 1968) 
Source: Ernst and Young (2009) 
Addition method 
(differentiated 
taxation) 
Quebec, Michigan (since 1953; De la Feria and 
Krever, 2012), France (since 1979; Pons, 
2006), Israel (since 1976; Gillis, 1987), 
Denmark (since 1988; Møller and Hjerrild, 
2013) 
Taxation 
of gross 
interest 
(full 
taxation) 
Argentina (since 1992; Zee, 2004). Proxy taxes: 
China (since 1994; Owens, 2014), on VAT since 1 
May 2016; KPMG, 2016), the Philippines (since 
1946; ZGLO, 2006), Taiwan (since April 1986, 
ROC, 2016), Thailand and Korea  
Financial 
Activities Tax 
(differentiated 
taxation) 
Iceland (since 2012; Keen et al., 2016) 
i 
None of the financial institutions of this country has opted to tax (Borselli, 2009). 
the exception of separate taxes. Table 3 reflects the methods of taxing financial 
services employed in international practice (see Gendron, 2008, and López-
Laborda and Peña, 2016 for an explanation), pointing out if the methods apply 
zero-rating (fully creditable input VAT, financial tax rate equals to zero), partial 
taxation (creditable input VAT, in some cases taxation of explicit fees), full 
taxation (creditable input VAT, taxation of explicit and implicit fees) and 
differentiated taxation (taxation of fees but not fully creditable input VAT). We 
expect this variable not to be significant, because it roughly corresponds to the 
cases reflected in cells II and IV of Table 1, in which businesses can claim VAT 
credit. As explained in section 3, in these cases, the competitive equilibrium of loan 
volume does not depend on the financial rate. The same result occurs in the case of 
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the exemption, which corresponds to the current VAT system reflected in Cell I of 
Table 1, with zero-rating of financial services on VAT and non-creditable input 
VAT for businesses. 
The second variable of interest is tb*separate, the interaction of the financial 
tax rate and the presence of separated taxes, which is measured by taking the value 
1 if the country applies a financial service tax other than financial VAT according 
to Table 3, or 0 otherwise. It corresponds with the case reflected in Cell III of Table 
1, in which the financial tax rate is higher than zero and businesses cannot credit 
their VAT payments. According to the Aigner and Bierbrauer (2015) model, we 
expect a negative sign for this variable. 
The size of the public sector is incorporated as an explanatory variable by the 
variable psize, measured by the ratio of the public expenditure to GDP, considering 
public expenditure as the government payments for operating activities for the 
provision of goods and services, including workers’ remuneration (as wages and 
salaries), interests and subsidies, donations, social benefits and other expenditures. 
The last variable related to the public sector is debt, which measures the total 
public debt of the government as a percentage of GDP.   
The commercial or geographical variables are: trade openness (openness), 
measured as the fraction between the sum of exports plus imports and the GDP; 
closed, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is landlocked, or 0 
otherwise; distance, which measures the average of the three bilateral distances 
between each country of the sample and France, Japan and the USA; and area, 
which is the size of a country measured by its area. 
The variables of the economic context included in the study are the following. 
The variable gdppc is the growth rate of GDP per capita. The non-monotonicity of 
the relationship between income and financial development is measured by the 
variable gdppc2, which is the square of the growth rate of GDP per capita. The 
presence of a financial crisis is included by the variable crisis, which takes the 
value 1 in the year of a systemic banking crisis and 0 otherwise. According to the 
World Bank and Laeven and Valencia (2013, p. 6): “A banking crisis is defined as 
systemic if two conditions are met: a. Significant signs of financial distress in the  
banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking 
system, and/or bank liquidations), b. Significant banking policy intervention 
measures in response to significant losses in the banking system. The first year that 
both criteria are met is considered the year when the crisis starts becoming 
systemic. The end of a crisis is defined the year before both real GDP growth and 
real credit growth are positive for at least two consecutive years.” The variables 
crisis, gdppc and gdppc2 have been lagged one period in order to avoid 
simultaneity and reciprocity problems with the dependent variables. The last 
variable of the economic context is inflation, measured as the growth rate of the 
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price index. According to the World Bank (2016), “inflation as measured by the 
annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator shows the rate of price change in 
the economy as a whole. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current 
local currency to GDP in constant local currency.”   
In addition, we incorporate some institutional variables, such as language, used 
as a proxy of institutional quality, representing the presence of at least one 
significant minority population whose native language is one of the five most 
widely spoken languages of Europe (English, French, German, Spanish and 
Russian). Another variable in this group is stability, which is the World Bank’s 
“Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” index, which “measures 
perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated 
violence, including terrorism. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate 
indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from 
approximately –2.5 to 2.5” (Kaufmann et al., 2010). 
There are also variables of investment, such as fdi, a variable that measures the 
net flows obtained in the acquisition of at least 10% of the shares in a business that 
operates in a different economy than the investor, or investment, measured by gross 
investment over GDP, being the investment the purchases of fixed assets plus the 
net variation of stocks.   
The next group of variables is related to the population and human capital. The 
gross rate of secondary education, which is the total of students in secondary 
school over the total people in the age range, is measured by the variable 
secondary. The variable density reflects the current population divided by the area 
of the country. The population is incorporated by the variable population, which is 
the growth rate of the current population estimated at mid-year. 
Among the sectoral variables, agriculture is the participation of agriculture in 
the GDP, and industry represents the participation of industry in the GDP. 
We also include some financial variables, such as lerner, a measure of the 
market power of the banking system. It compares the price of the final good with 
the margin costs (i.e. the mark-up). An increment of this variable indicates a 
depreciation of the competitive conduct of the financial intermediates. According 
to the World Bank (2016): “it is defined as the difference between output prices 
and marginal costs (relative to prices). Prices are calculated as total bank revenue 
over assets, whereas marginal costs are obtained from an estimated translog cost 
function with respect to output. Higher values of the Lerner index indicate less 
bank competition.”  
 The depth of credit information is included by the variable info, which is an 
indicator that measures the rules affecting the accessibility, breadth, and quality of 
the information available in the registers. The index takes the values 0–8, and 
higher values represent an availability of more credit information. 
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Another group of variables is related to infrastructure: the variable mobiles 
measures the mobile phone lines for each 100 people and the variable energy refers 
to the use of primary energy before its transformation to other fuels of final use. 
The last group of variables reflects the asset structure: the variable capital 
measures the ratio of bank capital and reserves to total assets, and capital and 
reserves include funds contributed by owners, provisions, general and special 
reserves, retained earnings, and valuation adjustments. The variable liquidity is the 
ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets, measured as the ratio of domestic 
currency holdings and deposits with the monetary authorities to claims on other 
governments, non-financial public enterprises, the private sector, and other banking 
institutions. 
All variables are obtained from the World Bank, with the exceptions of 
language and closed, obtained by the authors; the variable stability, obtained from 
the World Bank database; and the variable distance, obtained according to the 
definition of Chang et al. (2009), and from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). The 
variables tb*fVAT and tb*separated were constructed by the authors, according to 
Table 3 and diverse sources. Table 4 summarizes the expected signs of the 
variables and their source.  
6 Estimation and results 
In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, we are going to evaluate the 
correlation matrix of the variables. Variables with a correlation higher to 0.5 have 
been eliminated. The results are shown in Table 5. 
First we estimate non-robust models, in order to apply the Sargan test (of over-
identification of the instruments), and the Arellano-Bond test (of no autocorrelation 
of the residuals). The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is the validity of the 
instruments used, and this is analyzed in the three non-robust models. The null 
hypothesis is accepted in all three models. The null hypothesis of the Arellano-
Bond test is the serial autocorrelation of the residuals of order 1, and in the three 
models it is accepted that residuals are AR(1) and rejected that they are AR(2). 
The lags usually added in the literature to explanatory models of financial 
sector size (one lag) are incorporated in the specification. Finally, robustness is 
applied. In the robust models, the residuals are obtained by a WC-robust estimator 
derived by Windmeijer (2005), which is a bias-corrected robust estimator for two- 
step VCEs (variance-covariance matrix estimators) from GMM estimators. This 
estimator avoids possible heteroscedasticity problems. Once robustness is applied, 
we obtain a first model that includes all the variables that are relevant in the 
literature, in addition to our interest variables: the interaction of the financial rate 
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with financial VAT (tb*fVAT) and with separate taxes (tb*separate). If that model 
does not have good econometric properties, we build successive models, obtained 
 
Table 4: Expected signs 
Variable group Variable Sign Source 
Fiscal 
tb*fVAT 0 Aigner and Bierbrauer (2015) 
tb*separate (-) Aigner and Bierbrauer (2015) 
psize (-) Kahn et al. (2006) and Bahadir and Valev (2015) 
debt (-) 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004), Christensen (2005) and Ayadi et al. 
(2013) 
Commercial 
openness (+/-) 
(+): Rajan and Zingales (2003), Law and Demetriades (2005), Kahn et al. 
(2006), Klein and Olivei (2008) and Roe and Siegel (2011), (-): Kim et 
al. (2010, 2011) 
closed (+) Roe and Siegel (2011) 
distance (+/-) Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2011) 
area (+) Jaffee and Levonian (2001), Roe and Siegel (2011) 
Context 
gdppc (+) King and Levine (1993), Djankov et al. (2007), Allen et al. (2014) 
gdppc2 (-) 
Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) and 
Dominguez Martinez and Lopez Del Paso (2014) 
crisis (-) Kroszner et al. (2007) and Braun and Raddatz (2008) 
inflation (+/-) 
(-): Boyd et al. (2001), Detragiache et al. (2005), Do and Levchenko 
(2007), Kim et al. (2010), Luca and Spatafora (2012), Asongu (2014)  
and Bahadir and Valev (2015), (+): Kahn et al. (2006) 
Institutional 
language (+) Huang (2010b) 
stability (+) Law and Azman-Saini (2008), Roe and Siegel (2011) 
Investment 
fdi (0,-) (0): Ayadi et al. (2013) and Raza et al. (2014), (-): Asongu (2014) 
investment (+) Huang (2010a) and Luca and Spatafora (2012) 
Population 
secondary (+) Kim et al. (2011), Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2011) 
population (-) Asongu (2014) 
density (-/0, +) (-/0): Allen et al. (2014) , (+): Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2011) 
Sectorial 
agriculture (-) Raza et al. (2014) 
industry (+) Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Allen et al. (2014) 
Financial 
lerner (-) Braun and Raddatz (2008) 
info (+) Detragiache et al. (2005), Djankov et al. (2007) 
Infrastructure 
mobiles (+) Allen et al. (2014) 
energy (+) Shahbaz et al. (2013) 
Asset structure 
capital (+) Sharpe (1995) and Altunbas et al. (2010), Haldane and May (2011) 
liquidity (+) Sharpe (1995) and Altunbas et al. (2010), Haldane and May (2011)  
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Table 5: Correlation matrix of independent variables 
 
capital liquidity openness lerner psize info industry density mobiles 
capital 1.000 
        
liquidity 0.316 1.000 
       
openness –0.083 0.340 1.000 
      
lerner 0.191 –0.077 –0.068 1.000 
     
psize –0.220 –0.040 0.084 –0.061 1.000 
    
info –0.052 –0.236 –0.308 0.118 –0.244 1.000 
   
industry 0.157 0.475 0.247 0.054 –0.364 0.174 1.000 
  
density –0.382 –0.059 0.288 0.052 0.158 0.078 –0.070 1.000 
 
mobiles 0.034 –0.055 0.262 –0.179 0.144 0.008 –0.116 0.036 1.000 
stability –0.373 –0.090 0.226 –0.240 0.177 –0.198 0.027 –0.016 0.204 
debt –0.228 –0.250 –0.312 –0.026 0.253 0.298 –0.320 0.416 –0.106 
fdi –0.075 –0.025 0.120 0.077 0.054 –0.217 –0.196 0.041 0.146 
gdp 0.061 0.250 0.169 0.065 –0.264 –0.223 0.270 –0.097 –0.113 
gdp2 0.301 0.226 0.293 –0.014 –0.321 –0.232 0.071 –0.221 0.197 
crisis 0.042 –0.127 –0.048 0.015 0.362 –0.018 –0.406 0.061 0.204 
distance 0.011 0.022 –0.303 0.020 –0.257 0.152 0.249 –0.189 –0.221 
tb*fVAT –0.245 –0.193 0.265 –0.147 –0.029 0.125 –0.122 0.089 0.132 
tb*separated –0.102 –0.124 –0.107 0.082 0.115 –0.019 –0.125 0.032 0.077 
 
stability debt fdi gdp gdp2 crisis distance tb*fVAT tb*separated 
stability 1.000 
        
debt –0.069 1.000 
       
fdi 0.140 –0.112 1.000 
      
gdp 0.065 –0.298 –0.090 1.000 
     
gdp2 –0.048 –0.302 0.066 0.062 1.000 
    
crisis –0.059 0.249 0.112 –0.472 –0.053 1.000 
   
distance –0.109 –0.180 –0.054 0.019 –0.114 –0.154 1.000 
  
tb*fVAT 0.051 0.008 –0.006 –0.024 0.105 0.049 –0.041 1.000 
 
tb*separated 0.097 –0.038 –0.049 –0.090 –0.086 0.043 – –0.123 1.000 
 
from the previous one, eliminating successively the non-significant variables, until 
we obtain a model with good econometric properties. We have applied Im–
Pesaran–Shin and Phillips–Perron unit-root tests and we have not found any unit 
root problem on dependent variables. 
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All estimated models achieve the desirable econometric features and first lags 
are statistically significant, hence it is correct to think that the most suitable 
specification is the dynamic one. Table 6 reflects the results of the three models. 
According to the theory (Aigner and Bierbrauer, 2015), all the estimations obtain 
that financial VAT does not influence financial sector size. But all estimates also 
show that taxes on financial services separate from VAT do not influence financial 
sector size, in an apparent contradiction to what we would expect from the theory. 
However, it should be borne in mind that in the vast majority of countries applying 
separate taxes, businesses can partially credit input VAT, so this method 
approximates those ones reflected with the other variable of interest  
The Model 1 in Table 6 is the definitive model for the variable fsize, obtaining 
that the following variables determine financial development as measured by the 
loans of the financial sector as a percentage of GDP: openness, stability and 
gdppc2. All the signs are as expected. Openness has a negative sign, as found in 
Kim et al. (2010, 2011). Political stability has a positive impact on financial 
development, as seen in Law and Azman-Saini (2008) and Roe and Siegel (2011). 
Finally, the variable gdppc2 impacts negatively on financial sector size, as shown 
by Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) and Dominguez Martinez and Lopez Del Paso 
(2014).  
Model 2 is the definitive estimation for the variable bsize, showing that the 
following variables determine financial development measured by the loans of the 
banking system as a percentage of GDP: stability and gdppc2. They are the same 
variables as in Model 1, with the exception of openness, and with the same sign.  
Model 3 is the definitive model for the variable fdepth, finding that, once again, 
gdppc2 determines financial development, as in the previous models and with the 
same sign, but also the coefficient of industry appears to be significant, with the 
same sign as expected, according to Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Allen et al. 
(2014).  
In order to additionally check the consistency of the results, we have developed 
different robustness checks. We have considered other dependent variables, such as 
bank concentration or the number of bank branches, but none of them give 
estimations with good econometric properties. The only model that achieves the 
desirable econometric features from the robustness check models we have analyzed 
is the estimation with the variable risk. The variable risk is obtained from the 
World Bank, and reflects the logarithm of the Bank Z-score, defined as the 
probability of default of a country's banking system. According to the World Bank 
(2016), “Z-score compares the buffer of a country's banking system (capitalization 
and returns) with the volatility of those returns.” With this alternative dependent 
variable, our interest variables remain non-significant. 
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We have also constructed in alternative ways the interest variables. For 
example, we have distinguished among different methods of financial VAT, 
obtaining no significant differences between them. We have distinguished between 
full taxation and partial taxation or zero-rating, and differentiate taxation, as 
specified on Table 3. The results are similar: no significance of the interest 
  
Table 6: WC-robust GMM system models 
GMM System Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent Variable: fsize bsize fdepth 
Explanatory variables Coeff. Sign. p-value Coeff. Sign. p-value Coeff. Sign. p-value 
Dependent variable lag(t-1) 0.377 ** 0.016 0.496 *** 0.002 0.254 *** 0.004 
capital 0.008  0.541 0.003  0.823    
liquidity –0.002  0.431 0.000  0.97 –0.021  0.215 
openness –0.002 ** 0.047 0.000  0.963    
lerner 0.116  0.622 0.128  0.269 0.512  0.271 
psize 0.006  0.304 –0.004  0.392    
info –0.001  0.953 –0.008  0.596    
industry –0.001  0.882 –0.005  0.226 0.091 *** 0.000 
density –0.002  0.061 –0.001  0.216 0.005  0.297 
mobiles 0.001  0.172 0.000  0.951    
stability 0.116 ** 0.016 0.111 *** 0.009    
debt 0.001  0.537 0.001  0.412 –0.003  0.734 
fdi 0.000  0.384 0.000  0.584 0.000  0.512 
gdp 0.003  0.190 0.002  0.351 –0.017  0.162 
gdp2 –0.001 * 0.090 –0.001 *** 0 –0.003 *** 0.009 
crisis –0.039  0.207 –0.008  0.639 –0.277  0.289 
distance 0.000  0.645 0.000  0.356    
tb*fVAT –0.316  0.799 0.181  0.802 3.955  0.572 
tb*separate –1.921  0.689 –1.141  0.638 –0.056  0.995 
Sargan (p-value) 0.426 0.721 0.363 
Arellano-Bond (p-value 1st,2nd order) 0.012 0.713 
 
0.014 0.567 
 
0.000 0.934  
No Observations 208 208 322 
No Instruments 32 32 40 
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variables. Finally, we have re-estimated the three models of Table 6 by GMM in 
differences in order to look for the potential existence of asymmetries and 
eliminate them in order to avoid bias. We have found the same results, with the 
exception of the model explaining the variable fsize, in which we found a new 
result that is in line with the predictions of Aigner and Bierbrauer (2015): raising 
the financial tax rate in separate taxes negatively affects loan volume.  
7 Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have studied the existing theoretical literature on the possible 
influence of financial VAT on financial development (Aigner and Bierbrauer, 
2015), which asserts that in general, unlike Pigouvian taxes, financial VAT does 
not influence the size of the financial sector. For example, for a case that is similar 
to the taxation of financial services in a tax separate from VAT, Aigner and 
Bierbrauer (2015) obtain that the size of the financial sector would decrease with 
respect to the exemption method.  
In addition, we contribute empirical evidence about this lack of relationship, 
for the first time as far as we know, from a panel of 36 countries for the period 
1961–2012, using the econometric technique of dynamic panel data models. In 
accordance with the theory, we find that the financial VAT rate does not impact 
financial development. The results are robust to the dependent variable, target 
variables and the econometric methods used.  
Our research has focused on financial VAT. Further work could study the 
impact on the size of the financial sector of Pigouvian taxes, such as the Tobin tax, 
or financial transaction taxes. 
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